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INTRODUCTION
Sunk in the bottom of a depressed economy, we look back on
frivolous purchases of the past with a mixture of awe and disgust.
Someone bought a 603 carat diamond for a cool $12 million.1
Others sipped on $2 million dollar bottles of Cognac.2 People
magazine, instead, dropped $14 million dollars for rights to the
first photos of celebrities Angelina Jolie’s and Brad Pitt’s newborn
twins, Vivienne and Knox.3 This figure is hardly an outlier.
Actresses,4 musicians,5 models,6 and sports figures7 have all
pocketed huge sums of money by auctioning the rights to publish
the first photos of their infants, along with a story about the
growing family, often approved by the parents before publication.
Magazines are willing to pay the exorbitant amounts because, in
theory, the price is offset by the massive sales of the issue of the
magazine featuring the exclusive baby photographs plastered on
the cover.
The influence of American celebrities is felt worldwide. For
example, the infamous U.K. tabloid The Sun devotes an entire
1

The Lesotho Promise diamond, one of the largest diamonds ever found, sold at
auction for $12.36 million. See Reuters, Huge African Diamond Sells for over $12
Million, MSNBC ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15195458/.
2
Henri IV Dudognon Heritage, aged for more than one hundred years and sold in a
jeweled bottle, sells for approximately $2 million. See William Dowd, Dowd on Drinks,
Two Million Reasons This Cognac Is Claiming a World Record, TIMES UNION, Feb. 28,
2008, at E3, available at http://blog.timesunion.com/dowdondrinks/2-million-reasonsthis-cognac-has-a-world-record/384/.
3
People received the U.S. rights to the photographs and accompanying story, while
U.K. magazine Hello! received the rights to the photos in the U.K.; the companies split
the $14 million cost. Associated Press, Jolie-Pitt Baby Pics Fetch $14 Million, MSNBC
ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25967334. The couple donated
the money they received from the sale to charity. See id.
4
See Marcus Baram & Sheila Marikar, Are Celebrity Baby Photos Really Worth
Millions?, ABC NEWS, July 16, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/entertainment/story?id
=5378829&page=1.
5
See id.
6
Former Playboy model, Kendra Wilkinson, posed with her new son on the cover of
Ok! magazine. Introducing Kendra’s Baby Boy, OK!, Dec. 17, 2009, at cover page.
7
OK! magazine purchased the first pictures of actress Bridget Moynahan’s newborn
son with NFL star Tom Brady for $100,000. See The Inside Track, Bouncing Baby Brady
Graces Cover of OK Magazine, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 26, 2007, at 19, available at
http://bostonherald.com.nyud.net/track/inside_track/view.bg?articleid=1034114&cache_i
nterval=14121.
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section called “Bizarre USA” to American “showbiz;”8 Japan
frequently features Hollywood celebrities as spokespeople in
commercials;9 and actors confronting local customs are just as
highly publicized, such as when actor Richard Gere attended a
charity event in India.10 American “celebrity” status, long a
valuable commodity domestically, is increasingly advantageous in
foreign markets, which are now flooded with celebrity news from
across the globe.
Publicity rights have changed in the United States as
celebrities’ role in society has changed. The public’s attitude has
turned from adulation of celebrities in the past (e.g., the public’s
fascination and respect for first lady Jackie Kennedy) to a sense of
schadenfreude (e.g., the public’s encouragement of the rise and fall
of pop star Britney Spears). Although the attitude of the public
appears to have grown more malicious or spiteful in recent years,
celebrities benefit from this increased level of attention to the
details of their personal lives. Exclusive photos of lavish celebrity
weddings,11 front-page “coming out” stories,12 and pictures of stars

8

See Gordon Smart’s Bizarre USA, SUN, available at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/
homepage/showbiz/bizarre/usa/.
9
For example, both Keanu Reeves and Sean Connery have appeared in Suntory
Whiskey commercials. See Suntory, http://www.suntory.com/yamazaki/main.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2010); see also A Tale of Two Whiskies, http://sickbobby.blogspot
.com/2008/04/tale-of-two-whiskies.html (Apr. 27, 2008, 21:57 JST). The practice of
celebrity cameos was satirized by the film Lost in Translation, where Bill Murray
portrayed an aging American actor shilling for, incidentally, Suntory Whiskey. See id.
10
See, e.g., Gere-Shetty Kiss Provokes Outrage in India, CBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/arts/media/story/2007/04/16/gere-shetty-kiss.html.
Richard Gere
hosted an AIDS awareness event in India with a Bollywood actress, but his resulting
behavior (i.e., a playful, but public, kiss exchanged with the actress that led to a warrant
issued for this “obscene act”) generated more press than the actual event itself. Gere
Faces Indian Arrest Warrant, BBC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
entertainment/6596163.stm.
11
“Celebutante” Khloe Kardashian and fiancé Lamar Odom sold the rights to pictures
of their September 2009 wedding to Us Weekly for $300,000—perhaps a sign that the
economy is turning around. See Reid Cherner & Tom Weir, $300K for Odom-Kardashian
Wedding Photos?, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2009, http://blogs.usatoday.com/gameon/2009
/09/300k-for-odomkardashian-wedding-photos.html.
12
See Lance Bass: I’m Gay, PEOPLE, Aug. 7, 2006, at cover page & 86, available at
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,26334,1219142,00.html (noting that Lance
Bass’s story was “exclusively” given to People).
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acting “just like us”13 sell magazines to the voyeuristic public, but
they also enhance the marketability of those who appear on their
pages, whether willingly or unwillingly.
However, when
celebrities willingly invite news coverage of their private lives,
their claims that their privacy should be protected are undermined.
However pleased they are by positive publicity, celebrities
bristle at unflattering appearances in tabloid magazines and can sue
the publication under a number of claims, such as the right of
publicity. This right allows a person to control or prevent use of
her image, as well as to profit from any uses thereof.14
Enforcement of this right indirectly allows a celebrity to protect his
or her often highly guarded privacy. Many states recognize the
existence of this right in some form or another, basing it on a
convoluted history of privacy expectations and intellectual
property rights.15 However, some states contemplate a person’s
actions (such as inviting a tabloid to take photographs of children
or a wedding), and find that such actions undermine the
expectation of privacy and conflict with the public’s interest to
hear about events—and the tabloids’ right of free speech under the
First Amendment.16 Courts have had difficulty reconciling the
privacy and pecuniary interests of the celebrity with those of the
news-hungry public and have reached conflicting decisions both
among and within jurisdictions.17
This Note addresses the fractured state of the right of publicity
in the various states that recognize it and promotes the necessary
development of a comprehensive federal scheme. Part I of this
Note considers the development of the right of publicity in its
common law and statutory forms, its roots in common law
property and privacy rights, and the historical trend towards
federalization of other intellectual property rights. Part I also
explores the history of tabloid culture and public fascination with

13

The “Just Like Us” feature is a regular portion of Us Weekly, showing pictures of
celebrities doing ordinary things that purportedly make them just like the rest of us. See,
e.g., Carolyn Davis, Stars—They’re Just Like Us!, US WKLY., Nov. 23, 2009, at 26–27.
14
See infra Part I.B.
15
See infra Part I.B.3.
16
See infra Part II.B.3.
17
See infra Part II.B.4.
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celebrity figures. Part II of this Note outlines the diverging
scholarly views of a future for the right of publicity, reflected in
conflicting case law at the state level. This Part also analyzes the
newsworthiness exception that narrows the protection of the right
of publicity in some states. Finally, Part III of this Note
recommends the development of a less protective federal statute
that recognizes that the right of publicity has outgrown its privacy
roots and focuses instead on the restrictions set out by the
newsworthiness exception.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part explores the common law origins of the right of
publicity, first surveying the history of its analogues in the fields of
privacy and property rights. This Part then reviews several state
statutes that grant a right of publicity. Finally, this Part examines
the seedy but lucrative history of tabloid magazines and the
public’s obsession with all things celebrity, as exemplified by the
short-lived trend of multi-million dollar auctions of the exclusive
rights to photographs of celebrities’ babies.
A. Influences from Other Areas of Law
The right of publicity, despite its frequent enforcement by
those who are household names, applies to the reclusive common
man as well as to the often-photographed celebrity.18 The right
encompasses both privacy and property aspects: on one hand, the
enforcer of the right seeks to vindicate an invasion of his privacy,
and on the other, seeks to maintain control over profits that arise
from use of his image.19 Typically, to state a cause of action for a
18
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy notes that, “[t]he right of publicity is not merely a
legal right of the ‘celebrity,’ but is a right inherent to everyone to control the commercial
use of identity and persona and recover in court damages and the commercial value of an
unpermitted taking.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
1:4 (2009). Nonetheless, this Note focuses less on “everyone” and more on the
“celebrity.”
19
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2010) (describing the enforceable right of
publicity for unauthorized use of one’s image); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51
(McKinney 2009) (same); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2009)
(same).
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violation of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the
validity of his or her right of publicity; and (2) that this right has
been infringed upon by the defendant(s).20 Both interpretations of
state common law and statutory codifications of the right of
publicity require each of the two prongs.21 The second prong
usually requires that the plaintiff’s name or likeness be used for the
benefit of the defendant (whether for commercial profit or other
benefit) without the consent of the plaintiff in a manner likely to
cause harm to the plaintiff.22
In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit gave name
to the “right of publicity” in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,23 recognizing a growing trend in both privacy
and property law.24 In the fifty years since Haelen, the right of
publicity has been recognized under the common law of, or has
been statutorily defined by, many states. Twenty-eight of the fifty
states recognize some form of the right of publicity, either by
statute or as a right existing under the common law.25 Seven states
have statutory provisions that “encompass the right of publicity.” 26
Another ten states have privacy statutes that embody the
characteristics of the right of publicity.27 The courts in the
20

See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 3:2.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51. The common law
action in some states requires similar, if not the same, elements: “A common law cause of
action for appropriation of name or likeness [in California] may be pleaded by alleging
(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name
or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and
(4) resulting injury.” Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
22
See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347–48.
23
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
24
See id. at 868 (“[One has] the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture . . . . This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”).
25
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3 nn.8–9.
26
See id. § 6:3. California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 540.08
(West 2007 & Supp. 2010)), Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1-60 (2001)), Kentucky
(KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2741.01 (LexisNexis 2009)), Texas (TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001–.015
(Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2009)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2007 &
Supp. 2009)) all have explicit statutory provisions regarding the right of publicity. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3 nn.8–9.
27
MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3. Indiana (IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (2002 & Supp.
2009)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (West 1999 & Supp. 2009)),
21
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remaining eleven states have recognized that a common law right
of publicity exists, although there is no corresponding statute.28
1. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has a colorful history in the United States,
perhaps in part because the things that people most often want to
keep private are things that are scandalous or otherwise interesting
to the public. Courts did not recognize a common law right to
privacy until about 100 years ago,29 when Louis Brandeis, prior to
his tenure as a justice of the Supreme Court, and his close friend,
prominent Boston attorney Samuel D. Warren, published a seminal
article in the Harvard Law Review titled The Right to Privacy.30
This article advocated legal protection of “the privacy of private
life,” particularly from newspaper articles detailing private affairs
and other “flagrant breaches of decency and propriety.”31 The
authors noted the growth of legal rights that protected property, the
tangible as well as the intangible.32 Noting a judicial trend

Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 211, 25-840.01 (2009)), Nevada (NEV. REV.
STAT. § 597.790 (2004)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney
2009)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839.1 (2002 & Supp. 2010)), Rhode Island
(R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1997 & Supp. 2008)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-251101 to 1108 (West 2001)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2007 & Supp.
2009)), and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010))
have privacy statutes that correspond similarly to the elements of the right of publicity.
28
Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Utah, and Wisconsin all recognize a common law right of publicity. See MCCARTHY,
supra note 18, § 6:3 & nn.18–35 (listing several cases in each state that acknowledge a
common law right of publicity). Several states that have statutorily defined the right of
publicity have also found that the right of publicity exists in the common law (e.g.,
California and Illinois). See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3 n.25.
29
See E. Leonard Rubin, Rights of Publicity and Entertainment Licensing, 950 PLI/Pat
159, 163 (2008) (“There was no common law right of privacy prior to the publication of
the Warren-Brandeis article, which has been labeled by some as the most influential law
review article ever published.”).
30
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
31
Id. at 215–16. “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.’” Id. at 195.
32
Id. at 194.
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recognizing the existence of a “right to be let alone,” Brandeis and
Warren also noted that there was a sentiment “long keenly felt” by
the general public that the law should afford a remedy against “the
evil of invasion of privacy by the newspapers.”33 Although they
relied heavily on the concepts of propriety and decency in
encouraging the development of this right of privacy, Brandeis and
Warren also reflected on the existing torts of libel and slander,
finding them insufficient to protect against the exact wrongs
committed when privacy was destroyed by intrusive newspapers.34
Emphasizing the importance of allowing an individual to
determine his own thoughts or feelings (as evidenced by the
proprietary rights granted when an author pens a poem, for
example), the authors found that these so-called property rights in
fact encapsulated key privacy interests.35 However, they did not
find that the right to privacy was absolute.36 Instead, they felt that
“the right to privacy [should] not prohibit any publication of matter
which is of public or general interest.”37 Courts recognizing a right
of publicity would allow plaintiffs to seek damages, including
“substantial compensation . . . for injury to feelings,” and in a
limited number of cases, injunctive relief.38 The article, both by
recognizing a growing trend in courts nationwide (and worldwide)
and by emphasizing public sentiment toward invasive press, struck
a chord with the legal community after its publication.
In the decades following the article’s publication, courts across
the country picked up on Brandeis’s and Warren’s ideas, and most
acknowledged a common law right of privacy.39 For example, a
scant five years after the article was published, a New York court
33

Id. at 195.
See id. at 197.
35
See id. at 190–200, 213.
36
See id. at 214.
37
Id. The authors noted that there were certainly “difficulties in applying such a rule,”
but that courts would be able to discern the instances of matters of public interest,
particularly in instances where the individual seeking privacy had already made his
affairs public (e.g., an elected official who had, by dint of his position, already thrust
himself into the limelight). Id. at 214–15.
38
Id. at 219.
39
See, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 959 (D. Minn.
1948); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74, 79 (Ga. 1905); Schuyler v.
Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25–26 (N.Y. 1895).
34
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recognized the existence of a legal right to privacy in Schuyler v.
Curtis.40 In Schuyler, the relatives and friends of a deceased
woman sued a charitable organization, the Women’s Memorial
Fund (of which the deceased was a founder), for displaying a bust
of the dead woman, as well as circulating pamphlets with
information about her.41 The court noted at the outset that the right
of privacy was a nascent one, a right whose “boundaries [were not]
very well recognized or plainly laid down.”42 The relatives alleged
that she was a private woman who would have disliked this
attention, but the court was “unimpressed” by the claim, and found
that any claim of a right to privacy had died with the woman.43
A decade later, courts still grappled with the intricacies of the
ill-defined right to privacy. In a Georgia case, Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co.,44 a life insurance company in Atlanta,
Georgia, used a picture of resident Paolo Pavesich to depict a
satisfied customer of their life insurance policy—despite the fact
that he had not posed for the photograph and was not even a
customer of the company.45 The court analyzed the cases studied
in the Brandeis and Warren article, as well as cases that had
occurred in the fifteen years since its publication, before
concluding that a right to privacy existed (or should exist) in
Georgia.46 The court was “[s]o thoroughly satisfied” by the
existence of the right of privacy that it “venture[d] to predict that
the day will come when the American bar will marvel that a
contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and
ability.”47
Despite these inroads, development of the right of privacy was
not instantaneous, and courts nationwide continued to develop it
for several decades. For example, in Minnesota, the Minneapolis
Star and Tribune Company published a newspaper called The
Times: The Picture Newspaper, and in an issue ran a picture of
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
Id. at 69.
See id. at 74–79.
Id. at 80–81.
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local resident Carl Berg, taken when he was in a courtroom.48
Berg allegedly protested greatly at the time the picture was taken,
and filed suit, alleging a violation of his right to privacy.49 The
court recognized Brandeis’s and Warren’s article, but emphasized
the exception in cases of public interest.50 It noted that since
“pioneer days,” there had been clear public interest in courtroom
proceedings, and that the photograph was therefore a matter of
public interest and not subject to the right of privacy.51
Eighty-six years after the publication of The Right to Privacy,
Dean William Prosser enumerated this growing trend of
recognizing privacy rights in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.52
The Restatement identified four separate rights of action relating to
privacy: (1) “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another;” (2) “appropriation of the other’s name or likeness;” (3)
“unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life;” and (4)
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public.”53 Courts later used these four torts to distinguish
different types of privacy claims.54 By its language alone,
Prosser’s fourth tort seems to lend itself best to applications to
claims of violation of the right of publicity.
a) Evolution of Privacy Law to Publicity Law
The common law right to privacy is now recognized in the vast
majority of jurisdictions.55 In some states, the right to privacy has

48

Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 957 (D. Minn. 1948).
Id. at 958.
50
See id. at 959–60.
51
See id. at 960.
52
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. c (1977).
53
Id. § 652A.
54
See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 229–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing
the four torts and the application of the First Amendment); Cordell v. Detective Publ’ns,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (discussing unreasonable publicity given
to private life); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213–14 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1961) (same).
55
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A app., reporter’s note (noting that, as
of the mid-1970s, privacy rights were recognized under the common law of thirty-six
states and expressly rejected in only three); see also Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582
N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998) (stating that only Wyoming, Minnesota and North Dakota
49
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been broadly construed and used to cover claims that would
otherwise be brought under a right of publicity claim in other
states.56 For example, a case in Hawaii featured the typical
elements of a right of publicity claim: the defendant, a real estate
company, used pictures of the plaintiffs and their home, as well as
their names, “in sales brochures, in advertisements in publications,
and in television commercials” without their permission.57 The
court found that the defendant had “appropriated the plaintiffs’
name and personality for its own benefit in advertising,” but found
that plaintiffs had stated a claim for invasion of the right of
privacy, not publicity.58 This court was neither the first nor the last
to attempt to disentangle the two doctrines, and this case is an
example of how easily both courts and parties can mistake these
doctrines.
However, as more and more jurisdictions adopt either statutory
or common law rights of publicity, courts rely less frequently on
the right of privacy to cover the concept.59 The right of publicity
can include aspects of some or all of Prosser’s four torts,
depending on the wording and construction of the statute or the
interpretation of the underlying common law. In describing a
cause of action for a violation of the right of publicity, a California
court noted that “[i]n such an action a plaintiff does not rely upon
the inaccuracy of the content of an article; instead, he charges that
even if accurate the publication of the facts interferes with his
‘right to be let alone.’”60 This description is more or less an
amalgamation of Prosser’s first (“unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another”) and third (“unreasonable publicity given to
Courts have crafted an
the other’s private life”) torts.61
have failed to recognize any of Prosser’s four torts, and only Nebraska and New York
have expressly declined to recognize a common law right to privacy).
56
See, e.g., Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 142 (Haw.
1968).
57
See id. at 142.
58
Id. at 144. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010) (stating that a violation of
the right of publicity requires that the defendant misappropriate the plaintiff’s image,
name, etc., for his own commercial benefit).
59
See infra Part I.B.
60
Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1969) (quoting Melvin v. Reid, 297 P.
91, 92 (Cal. App. Dist. 1931)).
61
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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approximation of the right of publicity out of its tangled privacy
roots, but have also turned to its property aspects to develop the
nuances of the right of publicity.
2. Intellectual Property Rights
Unlike the privacy right aspect of the right of publicity, which
focuses on repairing mental anguish caused by the unauthorized
“publicity,”62 the property right aspect allows a plaintiff to control
(and profit from) the commercial use of his or her image.63
Intellectual property rights are largely in the domain of the federal
government; some, such as patents, have never been under state
control, whereas others, such as trademarks, have only recently
shifted to a uniform system of federal control.64
a) Copyrights and Patents
Copyrights and patents have a unique role in the federal regime
of intellectual property, as they are the only categories of
intellectual property mentioned directly by the Constitution.65 The
Constitution secures to the federal government the right “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”66 This clause has been so
long established as acknowledging protection of what we now
know as copyrights and patents that it has been given the moniker
“the Copyright clause.”67
Although the founders clearly
recognized the importance of both copyrights and patents, they
could not anticipate every creation (or “discovery”) that would
need to be protected, and the protective spheres of copyright and
patent have been expanded over time.

62

See id. § 652H(b) cmt. b.
See id. § 652C cmt. a.
64
This section serves as a brief overview of several important intellectual property
categories, but does not purport to cover a detailed history of each.
65
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3 (2008) (referring to
the clause as both the “Copyright-Patent clause” and the “Copyright clause”).
63
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The Copyright Act abolished all complementary state laws on
the subject in 1976.68 More recent incarnations of the statute have
widened the scope of the Act to include everything from literary
works such as poems and novels (as anticipated by the founding
fathers) to technological innovations such as sound recordings and
semiconductor chips (probably not as predictable at the time of the
drafting of the Constitution).69
Patents have an entire title of the United States Code devoted
to their intricacies.70 Patents protect novel inventions, from
methods of making chemicals71 to useful (or even not-so-useful)
objects.72 The first Patent Act was issued almost 220 years ago,
demonstrating a long history of federal control over this venerable
intellectual property right.73 However, the application of patents to
the field of the right of publicity is somewhat limited; trademarks
may in some ways provide a closer analogy.
b) Trademarks and the Lanham Act
The history of trademarks conflicts notably with the
straightforward trajectory of copyrights and patents. Trademarks
were traditionally protected by the common law of each state,74
and trademark owners claiming a misappropriation of their
trademark had to rely on the tort of unfair competition.75
Trademarks were not federally protected until 1870,76 and even
68

17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
70
Title 35 of the United States Code is appropriately and succinctly titled “Patents.” 35
U.S.C. Refs. & Annots. (2006).
71
See Henry Paynter, The First Patent, INVENTION & TECH., Fall 1990, at 19, 21
(describing the first patent ever issued in the United States, for a process of refining ash
for use in soaps and other items).
72
See, e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Obscure Patent of the Week: The Dog Umbrella and
Leash, IPWATCHDOG.COM, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/op_dog_umbrella
.html (describing a patent for a combination pet leash and dog umbrella).
73
For an interesting description of the history of the Patent Acts, and the first patent
ever issued, see Mary Bellis, The 212th Anniversary of the First American Patent Act,
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa073100a.htm.
74
See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).
75
See generally Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1800 (2007) (stating that trademark law
“emerged from the common law tort of unfair competition”).
76
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
69
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this first attempt at legislating universal protection of trademarks
was invalidated by the Supreme Court less than a decade later, in
1879.77 In the Trade-Mark Cases,78 the Court found that the Act
was unconstitutional, as Congress’s powers to regulate trademarks
were limited to those powers provided by the Commerce Clause.79
Throughout the next seventy years, more legislation was passed.80
Some proposals were more effective than others, but the general
confusion surrounding these pieces of legislation led to the
creation of the Lanham Act.81
The Lanham Act prevents, among other things, false
endorsement—it forbids the use of “any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” when doing so
would confuse (intentionally or otherwise) a consumer of the
product into thinking that the product was endorsed by or
sponsored by someone who is, in actuality, not affiliated with the
product.82 The Lanham Act was crafted by Congress largely to
deal with unfair competition and trademark infringement on a
federal level, when they had previously been addressed by states
alone.83 However, Congress also drafted the Act to modernize
state law to address business practices of the day, which had
changed greatly since the inception of the common law: “one of
the principal purposes of the 1946 revisions of the Lanham Act
was ‘(t)o modernize the trade-mark statutes so that they will
conform to legitimate present-day business practice.’”84
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can sometimes serve as an
“appropriate vehicle for the assertion of claims of falsely implying
77

See id. at 92–96.
100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).
79
Id. at 96.
80
See Law of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724; Law of March 3, 1881, ch.
138, 21 Stat. 502.
81
See Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for
Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner of a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 893, 933–37 (2008).
82
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
83
See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)
(“The Act’s purpose . . . is exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial
class against unscrupulous commercial conduct.” (citation omitted)).
84
Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276).
78
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the endorsement of a product or service by a real person.”85 Use of
a celebrity’s image could confuse consumers as to whether or not a
celebrity endorsed a particular product.86 However, the Lanham
Act’s provisions regarding false advertising may not be applicable
to publications that inform or entertain (such as tabloid
magazines).
3. Development of Intellectual Property and the Right of
Publicity
Just as intellectual property rights recognize the time and effort
that a creator expends when developing a new invention or
composing a piece of music, and reward the inventor with a
pecuniary benefit, the right of publicity recognizes that a celebrity
should enjoy certain benefits when he or she expends time and
effort to establish his or her celebrity “status,” name recognition,
and general desirability. Courts have slowly begun to recognize
the link between traditional forms of intellectual property and the
hybridized form found in the right of publicity.87 Although the
right of publicity has its roots in the right of privacy, its valuable
intellectual property aspects helped it expand nationwide.88 Judge
Jerome Frank in Haelan wryly noted that the right of publicity was
of such great concern to celebrities not because of fears of “having
their feelings bruised through public exposure,” but because they
“would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money” for

85

Albert v. Apex Fitness, No. 97 Civ. 1151, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8535, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1997) (quoting 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:15 (4th ed. 1996)).
86
See, e.g., Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that
defendants’ representation of the plaintiff in advertising might mislead consumers into
believing that plaintiff had endorsed the product).
87
“[S]ince the celebrity spends time, money, and energy in developing a commercially
lucrative persona, that persona is the fruit of the celebrity’s labor and entitles her to its
reward.” Sudakshina Sen, Comment, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right
of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739, 740 (1995) (discussing modern applications of
philosopher John Locke’s theory that a person has a property right in their own person
and in the work they produce).
88
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995); Alain J.
Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford A
Global Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 247–50
(2007).
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use of their image.89 Nonetheless, the court in that instance found
that whether or not the right of publicity was categorized as a
property right was “immaterial,” as the label “simply symbolizes
the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.”90
a) Incorporation into the Right of Publicity
Most right of publicity statutes require that the use of the
person’s name, image, or other “publicity” aspect be for trade or
advertising purposes;91 that is, that the violator is making money or
otherwise earning a benefit through unauthorized use of the
plaintiff’s image. In this sense, the right of publicity incorporates
aspects of a personal property right and allows for recovery of
damages. For example, California law awards plaintiffs “the
greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages
suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of the unauthorized use, and any
profits from the unauthorized use.”92 New York likewise allows
plaintiffs to “sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by
reason of such use,” and also permits “exemplary damages” at the
discretion of the jury.93 These economic damages mimic the
underlying purposes of intellectual property rights and separate the
right of publicity from the right of privacy, which focuses more on
protection of feelings of embarrassment or other emotional
injuries.
B. The Right of Publicity in the Common Law and Statutory
Forms
1. Common Law Rise of the Right of Publicity
Several states (though by no means a majority) recognize a
common law right of publicity.94 This change has taken place over
time, spurred in part by Brandeis’s and Warren’s article and the
resulting court reactions, as well as by the growth of various forms
89
90
91
92
93
94

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id.
Lapter, supra note 88, at 273.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2010).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009).
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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of media, from the radio to the Internet. Some states, such as
Pennsylvania, have recognized this common law right of publicity
by distinguishing it from similar rights, such as the general right of
privacy or the more specific tort of misappropriation of
commercial identity.95
Other states have recognized the right of publicity because of
the growing trend of nationwide recognition and the necessity of
protecting the interests at stake.96 Arizona is one such example. In
2007, a federal court reviewing Arizona law noted that “[i]t seems
clear to this Court that a celebrity’s interest in his name and
likeness is unequaled and has been recognized as such by more
than half the states in this country,” and found “no reason why a
claim for invasion of the right of publicity should not be
recognized in Arizona.”97 On the East Coast, a federal court
applying Connecticut law also saw “no reason” to “buck the
apparent trend in the law towards recognizing the right of
publicity.”98
Only one state has explicitly denied a common law right of
publicity.99 New York has denied both a common law right to
privacy as well as of publicity, and all claims for a violation of
either right must instead be brought under its statutory
provisions.100 This denial of a common law right to privacy was
made over one hundred years ago, when New York’s highest court
found that “the so-called ‘right of privacy’ has not as yet found an
abiding place in our jurisprudence, and . . . the doctrine cannot now
be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of
95
A Pennsylvania court noted recently “that although similar, the right of publicity is
not identical to invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness.” Rose v. Triple
Crown Nutrition, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-00056, 2007 WL 707348, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2,
2007).
96
See Pooley v. Nat’l Hole-In-One Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111–12 (D. Ariz.
2000) (discussing states that have recognized a right of publicity and why they have done
so); Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 189
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
97
Pooley, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
98
Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 867 F. Supp. at 189. Yes, even Muppets have a right of
publicity (or at least their creators can enforce it). See id.
99
See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902).
This case still serves as the standard of recognition for disavowal of a common law right.
100
See Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984).
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law.”101 The New York Court of Appeals has subsequently used
the fact that a common law right of privacy does not exist in New
York to hold that a common law right of publicity does not exist
either.102 The court held that “[s]ince the ‘right of publicity’ is
encompassed under the [New York] Civil Rights Law [section 50]
as an aspect of the right of privacy, which . . . is exclusively
statutory in this State, [a] plaintiff cannot claim an independent
common-law right of publicity.”103 Though New York is alone in
its explicit denial of this common law right, the difference between
the New York action for a violation of the right of publicity (i.e., a
recovery only under statute) and that of other states is more or less
a technical difference.
The development of the common law right is illustrated by a
number of cases across the United States. In Clark v. Celeb
Publishing, Inc.,104 Lynda Clark, a model, sued Celeb Magazine,
an apparently low-brow and “very explicit” pornographic
publication, under the California common law right of publicity
when the magazine used her photograph without permission in an
advertisement within the magazine.105 A photograph of the
plaintiff taking her pants off appeared on both the front and back
covers of the magazine, as well as in an advertisement inside,
bizarrely encouraging readers to “[t]ake off [their] pants and
subscribe to Celeb.”106 Clark claimed a number of emotional
problems resulting from this unauthorized appearance, as well as
an invasion of her privacy and a misappropriation of her
commercial identity (i.e., a violation of her right of publicity).107
The court awarded Clark economic damages to compensate for the
economic injury suffered due to the misuse of her image in a
commercial context.108 The court noted that “considerable money,
101

Roberson, 64 N.E. at 447.
See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584.
103
Id.
104
530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
105
Id. at 981. Although the court does not describe the reputation of the publication in
depth, it does reference plaintiff’s claim that gentlemen’s magazines such as Penthouse
(not particularly renowned for its classiness) wanted “nothing more to do with her” after
her appearance in Celeb Magazine. Id. at 982.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 983.
108
Id. at 983–84.
102
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time and energy” must be expended to “create considerable
commercial value in one’s identity” and that this self-created value
should be protected by the courts.109 Ms. Clark was able to recover
damages, both compensatory and punitive, from the magazine110
without invoking the complementary statutory protection in
California.111
In a more recent case in Minnesota, wrestler (not yet Governor)
Jesse Ventura brought charges against the wrestling organization,
the World Wrestling Federation (“WWF,” now “World Wrestling
Entertainment”), for distributing videotapes featuring his image
and commentary, alleging that the WWF had been unjustly
enriched by misappropriating his right of publicity.112 The federal
court found that Minnesota would recognize a common law tort of
the right of publicity, despite the fact that the state does not
explicitly recognize Prosser’s four torts of privacy.113
In
distinguishing the right of publicity from the right of privacy, the
court noted that “[t]he right to publicity protects pecuniary, not
emotional, interests.”114 Thus, the court reasoned, the wrestling
organization’s profit from Ventura’s name and image, without his
consent, violated this right, even though Minnesota did not
recognize any of Prosser’s four torts.115
The recognition of a common law right to publicity continues
to surface in recent cases,116 despite the rise of state statutes
covering the right.117 Even an homage to a celebrity, meant to be
flattering, can trigger a claim for misappropriation of this right.118
In Missouri, a Canadian hockey player, Tony Twist, sued comic
109

Id. at 984 n.2.
Id. at 984–85.
111
See id.; see also infra Part I.B.3.a (discussing the statutory right).
112
Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 725 (8th Cir. 1995). Ventura became
Governor of Minnesota three years later. See Pam Belluck, A ‘Bad Boy’ Wrestler’s
Unscripted Upset, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/1998/11/05/us/the-1998-elections-the-states-the-maverick-a-bad-boy-wrestler-sunscr
ipted-upset.html.
113
Ventura, 65 F.3d at 730.
114
Id. (citing Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280–81 (D. Minn. 1970)).
115
See id.
116
See, e.g., supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
117
See infra Part I.B.3.
118
E.g., Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
110
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book author Seth McFarlane for giving an evil mafia boss
character the same name.119 Although McFarlane was “a selfproclaimed hockey fanatic” who openly admitted that he had
deliberately named the villain after the plaintiff, the court found
that the defendant had “used Twist’s name and identity to gain a
commercial advantage.”120 The court found that the commercial
value of the plaintiff’s name outweighed the artistic license (and
perhaps fan worship) of the defendant, and awarded the plaintiff
$15 million for the misappropriation.121
2. Overlap Between Common Law and Statutes
Unlike New York, several states that recognize a common law
right of publicity also have a statute in place protecting the same or
similar interests.122 Despite their similarities, the statutory and
common law rights sometimes differ in the outcome or allowed
recovery.123 In California, for example, a plaintiff relying on the
common law right of publicity must prove: “(1) the defendant’s
use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s
name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.”124
California courts have acknowledged that the common law right of
publicity protects slightly different (although substantively similar)
interests than those that are protected by the statute.125 In reality,
however, the difference between statutory rights of publicity and
119

Id.
Id. at 59–60.
121
See id. at 52, 57–58.
122
See infra Part I.B.3.
123
See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (noting that the California statute “requires a ‘knowing’ use [of a plaintiff’s name,
photograph or likeness] whereas under case law, mistake and inadvertence are not a
defense against commercial appropriation,” which a plaintiff may not be able to prove).
124
Id. (basing the required elements of California’s common law right of publicity on
those of Prosser’s fourth tort, the tort of publicity that unreasonably places another in a
false light before the public); see also supra text accompanying note 53.
125
See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
protections afforded by the California common law right of publicity are much broader
than those available under its statutory complement); see also Michaels v. Internet Entm’t
Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“This distinction [between statute and
common law] is important because the common law right protects a broader range of
interests against a broader range of infringing conduct than does the statutory right.”).
120
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those granted by the common law are mostly a technical
difference, rather than one with meaningfully and discernibly
different outcomes.
3. Statutory Rights of Publicity
State statutes protecting the right of publicity can complement
the common law right of publicity, or they can subsume it entirely.
The statutes vary greatly in wording and scope. Development of
statutory protections has taken place over the last 100 years; each
statute represents specific demands on its individual state
legislatures brought by constituents, courts, or even celebrities.126
New York was the first state to draft a statute protecting the right
of privacy (including language that would be expanded by later
courts to include the misappropriation of the right of publicity).127
While some states, such as Utah128 and Virginia,129 enacted statutes
modeled after New York’s a few years later after its drafting, other
states developed their own statutes to be deliberately distinct from
the New York statute.130 One such state that does not adhere to the
elements of the New York statute is California. The two states are
perhaps the most interesting in regards to the right of publicity due
to their unique positions: California serves as undoubtedly the state
most populated by celebrities and thus as the pioneer of many
developments of the right of publicity, and New York represents
both a cultural center that attracts many celebrities as well as the
home of many publications. Moreover, both states incorporate a
“newsworthiness” exception that speaks directly to the line drawn
between the rights of celebrities and the rights of the public.131
126

Tennessee, for example, was prompted to draft its right of publicity to protect one of
its most valuable (deceased) denizens: Elvis Presley. See Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive,
But He Shouldn’t Be: The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 600–03.
127
See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009); MCCARTHY, supra note 18,
§ 6:72.
128
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-1 to 6 (West 2009).
129
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009).
130
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010).
131
See id. § 3344(d); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“In
this regard it is the established law of New York that the unauthorized use of an
individual’s picture is not for a ‘trade purpose’, and thus not violative of s 51, if it is ‘in
connection with an item of news or one that is newsworthy.’” (quoting Gautier v. ProFootball, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952) (citations omitted)).
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a) California
The statutory provision supplementing the common law right
of publicity in California is commonly known as the “Celebrity
Rights Act.”132 It protects the “name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness” of any person (not just a celebrity, despite the title of
the act) when any of the aforementioned are used without
permission, “for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods[,] or services.”133 The
post-mortem provision of section 3344.1 extends protection of the
right of publicity an additional seventy years after the death of the
celebrity in question, allowing the inheritors of the right of
publicity to continue to protect the celebrity’s image after his death
(the so-called “Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act”).134
One expects the case reporters of California, the most populous
state (and, according to McCarthy, the most litigious),135 as well as
the home of Hollywood and its pantheon of celebrities, to be
overflowing with decisions concerning the right of publicity.136
This is not so. For any number of reasons—settlement before an
ultimate adjudication, lack of interest in including these cases in
the reporters, or other factors—the number of cases reported pales
in comparison to those reported in other states, such as New
York.137
Nonetheless, numerous cases of angry celebrities versus defiant
magazines, promoters, and advertisers have made it to the pages of
the reporters. Eastwood v. Superior Court138 exemplifies a case
typically brought under the statutory provision governing the right
of publicity.139 Actor Clint Eastwood sued The National Enquirer
132

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.
Id. § 3344(a).
134
The statute overrules previous California case law, which had held that the
protection of publicity rights did not extend past the celebrity’s death. See Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979). The right of publicity is now a
devisable and descendible right. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d
215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978).
135
MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:11.
136
See id.
137
Id.
138
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
139
See id. at 344.
133
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for publishing a 600-word article about a purported love triangle in
which he was involved, including pictures of himself and one of
the women placed on the cover of the tabloid.140 To satisfy the
requirements of the statute, Eastwood was required to plead that
the defendants knowingly used his name and image without his
consent for commercial profit.141 Because he failed to do so, his
claim failed on statutory grounds.142
California recognizes an exception to the statutory protection
granted by section 3344: uses of the image that are considered
“newsworthy” do not violate the statute.143 Although California
courts have tended to apply the newsworthiness exception
broadly,144 they have failed to define “newsworthy” specifically. It
is unclear whether this protection applies to most tabloid-style
articles or pictorials, due to their tendency to stretch the truth for
the sake of sales, because “[e]ven though the [newsworthiness]
exceptions are to be broadly construed, the newsworthiness
privileges do not apply where a defendant uses a plaintiff’s name
and likeness in a knowingly false manner to increase sales of the
publication.”145 This exception to the newsworthiness exception is
aptly referred to most often as the “knowing falsehood”
exception.146
However, in Solano v. Playgirl,147 the court refused to classify
all tabloids or gossip magazines as publications that fell outside the
newsworthiness exception, merely because their purpose was to
entertain or amuse.148 The court found that even “vulgar”
publications can be classified as news and that news may serve to

140

Id. at 344–45.
See id. at 347. For an in-depth discussion of the facts and holding of the Eastwood
case, see infra notes 234–40 and accompanying text.
142
See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
143
Section 3344(d) provides that the use of an image, likeness, etc., does not violate the
statute when the use is “in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast
or account, or any political campaign.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2010).
144
See, e.g., Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 794 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
145
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002).
146
Id. at 1089 (citations omitted); Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
147
292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002).
148
See id. at 1089 n.8.
141
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entertain or amuse as well as to inform.149 Without the
newsworthiness exception, there might be no protection of First
Amendment concerns or a free press; its existence limits the
otherwise broad protections of the right of publicity in California
and prevents those seeking to enforce their publicity or privacy
rights from running roughshod over the interests of the public.
b) New York
New York has never recognized a common law right to
publicity, and instead, plaintiffs must rely entirely on sections 50
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Laws to protect their
publicity and their privacy rights.150 These laws prohibit the
nonconsensual misuse of a plaintiff’s “name, portrait, picture or
voice . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.”151
As in California, this cause of action allows for recovery in the
form of both appropriate damages and injunctive relief.152
The “misuse” must be for trade or advertising purposes;153 this
is a narrowly-construed categorization, crafted by the legislature to
“[strike] a balance” between the concerns of private individuals
and the First Amendment concerns that encourage “free speech
and a free press,” particularly in regards to events that are of
149

See id. For a full discussion of the case, see infra notes 227–32 and accompanying

text.
150
See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. One of the major problems with
the right of publicity, as opposed to the right of privacy, is that it remains a valuable right
after a person’s death and thus can be exploited by heirs and assignees. It no longer
retains the individuality and privacy concerns that exist while the person is alive.
However, in New York, neither the right of privacy nor the right of publicity has been
recognized as extending post-mortem. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:81.
Legislation has been introduced several times over the last twenty years in attempts to
grant post-mortem rights to the heirs or successors of the deceased, but has failed to
become law. The most recent attempt to extend the rights of publicity after death was
introduced in 2007, but has yet to make progress in the New York State Senate. See, e.g.,
2009–2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5066. Opponents of the bill express concern that the bill, as
drafted, would be unconstitutional, would impermissibly restrict freedom of the press,
and would be difficult to implement in practice. See NYC BAR ASS’N, REPORT
EXPRESSION OPPOSITION TO A.8836/S.6005 (2009), available at http://www.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/Dead_Celebrities.pdf.
151
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009).
152
See id. § 51.
153
See id.
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general noteworthiness.154 It does not include “incidental” uses of
a plaintiff’s name, likeness, etc.155 Judges have particularly
explored the boundaries of the words “portrait” and “picture;”
although it is “settled that ‘any recognizable likeness, not just an
actual photograph, may qualify as a ‘portrait or picture,’’” the
words are still interpreted on a case-by-case basis.156
Like California, New York also recognizes a newsworthiness
exception to the right of publicity statute (although it is not
codified, as it is in California),157 which allows publications to use
celebrities’ names and likenesses without their consent when the
matter is one of public interest.158 “New York courts early
recognized the need to encourage the free exchange of ideas” when
reviewing claims for an invasion of privacy or a misappropriation
of the right of publicity, and they thus “created a broad privilege
for the legitimate dissemination to the public of news and
information.”159
Although the exception is not statutorily
conferred, it is as broadly recognized as it is broadly construed.160
Adding to the ambiguity of this uncodified exception is the
existence of certain exceptions to the newsworthiness exception.161
One such exception-to-the-exception is the reasonable relation
requirement, articulated in Finger v. Omni Publications
International.162
This exception applies to pictures that
154

D’Andrea v. Rafla-Demetrious, 972 F. Supp. 154, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting
Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982)). This concern also
speaks to the newsworthiness exception. See infra notes 158–67 and accompanying text.
155
Id. at 157. “In other words, ‘isolated’ or ‘fleeting and incidental’ uses of a person’s
name or image, even if unauthorized, are insufficient to establish an invasion of privacy
claim.” Id. (quoting Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)).
156
See, e.g., Burck v. Mars, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (considering different
possible interpretations for a picture or a portrait in various cases).
157
See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
158
See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
159
Id. at 131.
160
See, e.g., Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, 566 N.E.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 1990) (“Although
the statute does not define ‘purposes of trade’ or ‘advertising,’ courts have consistently
refused to construe these terms as encompassing publications concerning newsworthy
events or matters of public interest.” (citations omitted)).
161
See id. at 144.
162
566 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990).
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accompany an article that is a matter of public interest; if the
picture has no “real relationship” to the article or the article is an
advertisement in disguise, then the right of publicity statute
applies.163 The real relation exception is less protective than it
seems—in Finger, the court held that there could be a real relation
between an article about in vitro fertilization and other techniques,
such as “caffeine-spritzed sperm,” and an image of the defendant’s
family of six children (none of whom were conceived through in
vitro fertilization or caffeinated sperm).164 The court therefore
found that an article generally about fertility and an image of a
family that was probably fairly fertile were adequately related.165
Additionally, the newsworthiness exception does not apply
when “the defendant’s use was infected with material and
substantial fiction or falsity.”166 However, a simple factual or
research error will not suffice; instead, the defendant must have
acted with “some degree of fault” or otherwise have known in
some way that the misuse was false.167 This exception is similar to
that of California’s knowing falsehood exception.168 The knowing
falsehood exception is the most useful to celebrities seeking to
vindicate their rights in light of an obviously exaggerated or
untruthful tabloid article.
C. Tabloids
1. History
Tabloids serve many purposes.169 To reputable newspapers,
they represent the scourge of the publishing industry; to celebrities,
they serve as a harbinger of bad publicity; to the supermarketgoing public, they are a guilty pleasure glanced at surreptitiously
while waiting in the checkout line. Named after a condensed pill
163

Id. at 143 (quoting Murray v. N.Y. Magazine Co., 267 N.E.2d 256, 258 (N.Y.
1971)).
164
See id. at 143.
165
Id.
166
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 1984).
167
Id.
168
See id.; see also Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
169
Excluding liner for bird cages.
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popular in pharmacies at the turn of the century,170 the category of
“tabloid journalism” is both a genre involving scandalous, notalways-true, vapid news stories, and an epithet denoting the lowest
form of journalism. In the 1960s, these broadsheet papers turned
their focus from alien abductions to the foibles of the celebrity
world, latching on to the nuances of Jackie Kennedy’s marriage to
Aristotle Onassis or the death of Elvis Presley.171 Throughout the
last fifty years, tabloid circulation and popularity has ebbed and
flowed, but a number of changes have invigorated the industry.
Some are simple: Star Magazine, once relegated to the racks
behind the conveyer belt at the supermarket checkout with the
other tabloids, has since been moved to the ranks of long-running
women’s magazines like Cosmopolitan or Vogue, due to its new
glossy format.172 Other changes are more complicated, arising
from advancing technology, such as the popularity of celebrity
gossip websites, which can report news—or, more likely,
rumors—faster than a traditional print medium.173
2. Celebrity Culture
Whether tabloids ignited American fascination with celebrities
or simply recognized this fascination and profited from it, this
phenomenon has not gone unrecognized by legal scholars:

170

See T.F. HOAD, Tabloid, in THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH
ETYMOLOGY (1996), available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O27-tabloid.html.
171
Kate Pickert, A Brief History of: Tabloids!!, TIME, Aug. 25, 2008, at 18, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1832868,00.html. Pickert notes that
The National Enquirer paid a relative of Elvis Presley to photograph him in his coffin,
attesting to the incredible lengths tabloids will go to for the exclusive inside celebrity
scoop. Id.
172
See id. Star switched from a broadsheet, newsprint format to a glossy, magazinelike format in 2004. Id.
173
For a sampling of celebrity gossip websites written in different “voices,” ranging
from the gossipy insider to the macho chauvinist, see, e.g., D-Listed, http://www.
dlisted.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Oh No They Didn’t (ONTD), http://www.live
journal.com/community/ohnotheydidnt (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Perez Hilton, http://
www.perezhilton.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); What Would Tyler Durden Do?,
http://www.wwtdd.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). The eponymous author of the Perez
Hilton blog has parlayed his inside knowledge of the celebrity sphere into numerous
guest-hosting spots at popular bars and clubs, and even a television special on VH1.
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A good deal of coverage in the media devoted to
celebrities seems to delight in the misfortunes of
prominent people. The Germans have a word for
the human impulse to take pleasure in the
misfortunes of others: Schadenfreude. “Seeing such
rich, arrogant people brought down to earth is for
many deeply satisfying.”174
However, the increasing attention paid to celebrities has
engendered a backlash of lawsuits filed by the celebrities, in
attempts to protect their privacy, their good name, or at least
recoup some of the revenue earned by the tabloids when an image
of the celebrity (and often a shocking headline) is splashed across
the cover of a tabloid. Most of these lawsuits proceed on a variety
of theories and encompass several claims, from infliction of
emotional distress to the misappropriation of the right of
publicity.175 For example, when The National Enquirer published
a fabricated interview with Clint Eastwood about his relationship
with actress Frances Fisher and his newborn baby,176 he sued the
tabloid for a host of wrongs: violation of the Lanham Act; invasion
of his personal privacy; misappropriation of his likeness under
both statutory and common law grounds; and damage to his
reputation.177 As seen in this example, the interactions between
celebrities and tabloids are complex, and outcomes can vary
widely by state, depending on which causes are recognized either
statutorily or under the common law, and which exceptions apply.
II. DIVIDED SCHOLARSHIP—HOW SHOULD THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY EVOLVE?
This Part of the Note analyzes the divide between scholars and
courts who advocate a more protective right of publicity and those
who champion a less protective right of publicity or even propose
174
MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 8:56 & n.4 (quoting Prof. John Portman, quoted in K.
Breslau, Silicon Valley’s Latest Craze: Schadenfraude, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2000, at 64).
175
See Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997), for an example
of a lawsuit encompassing several theories.
176
Id. at 1250.
177
Id.
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to eliminate it entirely. It illustrates these viewpoints with
inconsistent outcomes between two major players in the right of
publicity debates, New York and California. This Part additionally
considers “newsworthiness” exceptions that are more or less
protective and considers their relation to the growth—or decline—
of the right of publicity.
A. Protecting Celebrities: Arguments in Support of a Strong Right
of Publicity
Many commentators view the growth of the right of publicity
as a work-in-progress and advocate a federal system that
recognizes the right and expands its protection or encourages more
states to take a protective stance.178 These scholars espouse the
growth of the right of publicity for a number of reasons: there is a
growing trend of states to recognize the right of publicity;179 the
right of publicity has expanded from privacy or other intellectual
property roots;180 and celebrities require protection from
increasingly aggressive and intrusive behavior from paparazzi or
magazines.181 These scholars often advocate a more stringent
newsworthiness exception,182 which would eliminate the protection
for certain uses in publications, while limiting First Amendment
protections.
1. More Recognition but Less Uniformity Among States
Although more states have come to accept a right of publicity
over the last fifty years, each state’s interpretation of what, exactly,
constitutes this right can differ sharply.183 The differences in these
statutes breed a lack of uniformity among forum states, allowing
178

See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity,
49 DUKE L.J. 383, 477 (1999).
179
See id. at 394–400.
180
See id. at 411–12.
181
See generally Keith Willis, Note, Paparazzi, Tabloids, and the New Hollywood
Press: Can Celebrities Claim a Defensible Publicity Right in Order to Prevent the Media
from Following Their Every Move?, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 175, 178 (2007)
(discussing examples of celebrities being hounded by the media).
182
See, e.g., id. at 186–92.
183
See generally Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of
Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 45 KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997).
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celebrities to “forum-shop” in order to obtain a favorable result in
one jurisdiction, where the outcome might not be as favorable in
another.184 More simply, the lack of uniformity among states,
particularly with respect to the newsworthiness exception, makes
right of publicity protection essentially available on a case-by-case
basis.185 This lack of uniformity differs from other intellectual
property rights, which often derive their strength from their ability
to be protected in the same or similar fashion in every jurisdiction
(and, increasingly, among countries).186 Because of the lack of
homogeny among cases and statutes, some commentators advocate
for a stronger federal right of publicity.187
2. Development Away from Privacy or Property Rights
Other commentators advocate for a stronger right of publicity
because they believe it has outgrown its origins in privacy law.188
At the same time, these commentators note that the right of
publicity also differs in important respects from property rights.
Professor Michael Madow articulates this disjunction by noting a
difference between the right of publicity and other intellectual
property torts: a celebrity “is not the sole and sovereign ‘author’ of
what she means for others.”189 This view finds that “celebrity” is
created not just by the celebrity and her labor, but also by the
cultural and contextual meaning infused by the media, the

184

See generally Kevin M. Fisher, Comment, Which Path to Follow: A Comparative
Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 95 (2000) (noting that the
benefits of a federal right would reduce the likelihood of forum shopping by celebrities).
185
See generally Langvardt, supra note 183 (detailing the host of evils that have
resulted from conflicting state laws and interpretations of the right of publicity).
Langvardt also addresses the possibility that celebrities would want to sue in federal court
and thus tack on a possibly redundant or unnecessary Lanham Act claim to obtain
jurisdiction. Id. at 355–56.
186
See supra Part I.A.2.
187
See, e.g., Eric J. Goodman, Comment, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227 (1999); Sean D.
Whaley, “I’m a Highway Star”: An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257 (2009).
188
See Haemmerli, supra note 178, at 383 (noting the prevailing “doctrinal bifurcation
of publicity and privacy rights”).
189
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 195 (1993).
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audience, and others.190 This view also strips away the argument
that the right of publicity is analogous to a privacy right because a
privacy right is entirely contained within (and created by the
existence of) one person.191
Sometimes, however, scholars suggest that it is the Lockean
property aspect that the right of publicity has outgrown.192 Some
commentators reject the Lockean labor theory that underlies most
intellectual property rights (i.e., the idea that the labor and creative
energy put into an object make it property).193 Instead, scholars
such as Dean Alice Haemmerli propose an alternate view: that the
right of publicity is “a property right grounded in human
autonomy.”194 This conception of the right of publicity eschews
the idea that labor makes the right of publicity valued, and instead
embraces the moral or personal aspects of the right of publicity.195
This “Kantian” understanding avoids First Amendment concerns
by making the right a purely personal one that can be exercised at
will.196 This autonomous conception of the right of publicity
would, in theory, allow a celebrity to object to any unauthorized
use, regardless of its newsworthiness, because of its innate
connection to the celebrity’s personhood.197
Other scholars likewise focus on the underlying property
interests that helped to generate the right, but do not reject its
Lockean labor underpinnings.198 Professor David Westfall, for
example, analyzes the role of the right of publicity in bankruptcy,
martial assets, and other transferring situations to support his thesis
190

See id. at 193, 195.
See generally discussion supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the evolving definition of the
right to privacy); Part I.A.1.a (discussing how some states have analogized the right to
privacy to the right to publicity, and have broadly construed the right to privacy to cover
claims that would otherwise be brought under right of publicity claims in other states).
192
See Haemmerli, supra note 178 (focusing instead on the moral and personal aspects
of the right of publicity).
193
See, e.g., id. at 383.
194
Id. at 385.
195
Id. at 421–22.
196
See id. at 429–30.
197
Id. at 433 (“Indeed, with a freedom-based right capable of general application, [a
celebrity] could theoretically object to any unauthorized use.”).
198
See, e.g., David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71 (2005).
191
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that scholarship and courts alike should view publicity rights in the
context of property.199 However, he warns against the tendency of
judges and scholars alike to “fall victim to the property syllogism,”
instead suggesting that the deeply personal nature of the right of
publicity (as opposed to, for example, the less personal attachment
an inventor has to a patent or a company to a trademark) should
require that those analyzing the right of publicity “weigh
competing policy concerns against one another every time a new
context arises in which the label of property has consequences.”200
Advocates of a stronger right of publicity who focus on the
property aspects share a line of thought with advocates who focus
on the economic implications of the right of publicity: both note
the monetary value at stake in the right.
3. Inherent Unfairness and Celebrities’ Need for Protection
Scholars who advocate for a stronger right of publicity also
reject assumptions that the right is not worth protecting because,
for example, celebrities earn plenty of money already or are not
harmed when their images are used.201 These arguments consider
the literal value of the right of publicity, in the revenue brought in
to tabloid magazines by their use of celebrity images, as well as the
potential dangers that face celebrities when the actions of the
paparazzi and tabloids are unregulated.202
a) The Value of the Right of Publicity and Protection from
“Free-Riding”
Another dimension to the argument for a structured right of
publicity is concerns about “free-riding;” that is, concerns about
199

See id. at 113–17.
Id. at 123.
201
See Goldman, supra note 126, at 614–15 (wryly noting that celebrities are already
“well-compensated,” even without collecting on their right of publicity).
202
See Samantha J. Katze, Note, Hunting the Hunters: AB 381 and California’s
Attempt to Restrain the Paparazzi, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1349,
1351–53 (2006) (discussing accidents and break-in attempts by paparazzi and the
constitutional challenge in regulating their behavior); see also David Tan, Beyond
Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Cultural Studies, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 913, 959–65 (2008) (examining the economic associative
value of the celebrity personality).
200
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the inherent unfairness from those using a celebrity identity in a
commercial context without having to pay for each use.203
Scholars argue that these concerns override the potential conflicts
with the First Amendment by limiting enforcement of the right of
publicity when a usage is potentially “newsworthy.”204
Intellectual property attorney W. Mack Webner puts this
position succinctly: “The press . . . should not, and need not, be
exempt from paying for the use of the persona of a celebrity when
the use is for purely commercial purposes.”205 Looking at two
similar cases concerning sports figures, he finds that the grant of
newsworthiness to the papers that used the players’ images, were it
to be granted in any other context (e.g., a sports retailer) would
“mock[] the publicity right” entirely.206 Like other commentators
in this position, he finds troubling the fact that “[n]ewsworthiness
is interpreted sufficiently loosely and broadly so that almost any
activity associated with a press activity will be held to be under
[its] umbrella.”207 Commentators recommend reducing the reach
of the newsworthiness exception, and sharply identifying when the
use of a celebrity’s image is commercial, so that the celebrity may
advance his or her publicity right.208 “When . . . [publishers] use
the images of celebrities in advertisements intended to sell their
publications, they should pay for the use just as car manufacturers
and clothing manufacturers must.”209 By this line of thinking, the
subscription cards inserted into each Us Weekly, featuring pictures
of actress Katie Holmes at an awards ceremony, would be violative

203

See Tan, supra note 202, at 932 (noting the law should prohibit free-riding for moral
reasons); W. Mack Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line
Between Commercial Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171,
190, 194 (2004) (arguing that the press should not be able to use the property of others
for commercial gain without compensating the owner).
204
See Webner & Lindquist, supra note 203, at 194.
205
Id. at 188.
206
Id. at 190.
207
Id. at 193.
208
See Tan, supra note 202, at 982, 992 (advocating a test that “takes into account a
subjective inquiry into the intentions of the defendant”); Webner & Lindquist, supra note
203, at 190 (arguing that the broad interpretation of “newsworthiness” currently applied
by courts seems to allow newspapers and magazines a “free license to use celebrity
personas”).
209
Webner & Lindquist, supra note 203, at 194.
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of her right to publicity, and she should be compensated, just as
she would be if she agreed to model clothes for Miu Miu.210
Other scholars echo this view and deride the “free-riding
exploitative commercial use” of celebrity images by tabloid
magazines.211
One scholar, David Tan, notes that “the
contemporary reality of the celebrity economy suggests a degree of
protection ought to be accorded” to the celebrities.212 Tan suggests
changing the inquiry in the newsworthiness exception to one of the
defendants’ intentions; this would preserve First Amendment
rights to artistic liberties (and, more broadly, the news) but would
prevent this economic “free-riding.”213 These economic concerns
hearken back to the property aspects of the right of publicity, but
growing concerns about the safety of celebrities and others in the
face of an unfettered paparazzi speak to the right of publicity’s
privacy roots.
b) Anti-Paparazzi Statutes
The threatening presence of the paparazzi is troubling not only
to celebrities, but those who are injured or otherwise disturbed by
their aggressive, intrusive behavior, resulting in an increase of state
legislation that targets the paparazzi.214 Car accidents from the
mundane, such as Britney Spears running over the foot of a
paparazzo,215 to the extreme, such as the deaths of Princess Diana
and fiancé Dodi al Fayed after a high-speed pursuit by paparazzi
on mopeds,216 have alerted state legislatures to the problems that
210

See generally Leisa Barnett, Katie Holmes’ Miu Miu Ad Unveiled, VOGUE U.K., Jan.
14,
2009,
http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/daily/090114-katie-holmes-miu-miu-adsunveiled.aspx.
211
Tan, supra note 202, at 992.
212
Id.
213
See id. at 982, 992–93.
214
See Katze, supra note 202, at 1352–53 (listing numerous traffic accidents and breakins caused by paparazzi tracking celebrities, which spurred the amendments to the Civil
Code).
215
See generally Britney Spears Appears to Run over Foot of Celebrity Photographer,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/19/america
/NA-GEN-US-Spears-Photographer.php.
216
See generally Coroner Plans Inquest in Death of Princess Diana for January, USA
TODAY, Dec. 18, 2003, at 14, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/200312-18-diana-inquest_x.htm (discussing the lingering controversy about the accident).
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face both celebrities and ordinary citizens on the roads when
paparazzi try to get that perfect shot.
California has amended its civil code to attempt to curb this
behavior, or at least provide celebrities with other recourses.217
Couched in the language of privacy, this statute ensnares
aggressive paparazzi by denoting the acts of picture-taking, sound
recording, or other invasive techniques, particularly when the
plaintiff is engaged in a “personal or familial activity under
circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation
of privacy;”218 it also encompasses the tabloids that often employ
them, whether or not there is an employee-employer
relationship.219 However, the plaintiff engaging in these familial
activities must have had a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”220
Advocates of a strong right of publicity recognize the fact that
celebrities are “followed, hounded and even harassed when they
leave their homes.”221 Some promote a more expansive right of
publicity not only to protect celebrities’ proprietary interests in
their name and to prevent an overly expansive view of the
newsworthiness exception, but also to shield celebrities from the
aggressive and often dangerous tactics of the paparazzi.222
These statutes serve not as a means of addressing the validity
of the right of privacy or curbing its limitation by the First
Amendment, but instead to comment on a different aspect of the
problem of tabloid magazines: the very dangerous way in which
these “candid” photos of celebrities are obtained.

217

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2010).
Id. § 1708.8(a)–(b) (creating liability when a person trespasses to capture these
images or sounds, or invasion of privacy otherwise).
219
Id. § 1708.8(e).
220
Id. § 1708.8(b). Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger recently signed an amendment to
this law that expands the definition of privacy; the amendment took effect in January of
2010. See Schwarzenegger Signs New Anti-Paparazzi Law, CNN, Oct. 14, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/10/14/paparazzi.law/index.html.
221
Willis, supra note 181, at 178.
222
See id. at 200–01. See generally Lisa Vance, Note, Amending Its Anti-Paparazzi
Statute: California’s Latest Baby Step in Its Attempt to Curb the Aggressive Paparazzi,
29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 99 (2006) (detailing the various amendments to
California’s statute and suggesting changes for its success).
218
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4. State Support for a Restrictive View of Newsworthiness
Some commentators see the expansion of the right of publicity
as being distinct from its property and its privacy origins.223 These
commentators focus on the economic realities of the situation—
tabloids subverting the newsworthiness exception to their
commercial advantage, and encouraging more and more aggressive
behavior by the paparazzi they employ directly or indirectly.224
The concerns advanced by these commentators are not without
support in the case law. In fact, courts’ restrictions on the
newsworthiness exception reflect these opinions and suggest that
the right of publicity is broadening in two influential states,
California and New York.225
a) California
Courts have placed certain restrictions on the newsworthiness
exception, providing greater protection to celebrities who
challenge the legitimacy of publications claiming that their use
falls under these exceptions.
In Solano,226 actor Jose Solano, Jr., at the time well-recognized
for his portrayal of a character on the beach-drama Baywatch, was
featured on the cover of Playgirl, a pornographic magazine
“ostensibly focused on a female readership.”227 Solano neither
posed for the magazine nor granted them an interview, and,
perhaps disappointingly to the readership, did not appear nude
anywhere in the issue.228 Despite such promising cover taglines as
“Primetime’s Sexy Young Stars Exposed” and “12 Sizzling
Centerfolds Ready to Score With You” framing the cover image of
Solano, his sole appearance in the magazine was a clothed picture

223

See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
See, e.g., Vance, supra note 222, at 102 (describing aggressive tactics used by the
paparazzi in pursuit of a celebrity).
225
See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (restricting the
newsworthiness exception in California); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727–28
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
226
This case is briefly discussed supra text accompanying notes 147–49.
227
Id. at 1080.
228
Id.
224
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with a brief profile as part of a relatively tame (and non-nude)
article about rising television stars.229
Solano sued the magazine on a variety of privacy and publicity
claims under California law, claiming both a violation of the right
of publicity statute, as well as the common law right of
publicity.230 The court of appeals disagreed with the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, which held that the use fell
under the newsworthiness exception and therefore denied recovery
to Solano.231 Instead, the court of appeals found that Solano had
raised a genuine issue as to whether the magazine had used the
picture, despite knowing that its representation was false.232 The
court remanded the case to the district court with a warning that the
newsworthiness exception was not infinite and that malicious
intent or knowing falsehoods could remove its protection
entirely.233
Similarly, the court in Eastwood refused to allow an entirely
“unfettered press.”234
The National Enquirer, a prominent
supermarket tabloid, published an article claiming that actor Clint
Eastwood had found himself in a tumultuous “love triangle”
between singer Tanya Tucker (with whom he allegedly “publicly
‘cuddled’” for ten nights) and actress Sondra Locke (who
purportedly “camped at his doorstep” to beg him to take her
back).235 Eastwood was not as amused or entertained as the
tabloid-buying public may have been and sued the tabloid for,
among other things, both a violation of the statutory right of
publicity and the complementary common law right.236 Though
the court acknowledged that there were exceptions to be made for
public interest, particularly involving “‘people who, by their
accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling,
229

Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1088. The court here terms the common law right of publicity as “commercial
misappropriation invasion of privacy.” Id.
231
Id. at 1089.
232
See id.
233
Id. Over six years later, the case is still pending on remand, probably due to some
form of settlement agreement between the two parties.
234
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
235
Id. at 345.
236
See id. at 347.
230
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create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities,’”237
it also recognized that this exception should not come at the “total
sacrifice” of celebrities who work to maintain their status.238
Although Eastwood’s claim ultimately failed because he failed to
specifically allege in his cause of action the “scienter of the alleged
calculated falsehood” of the Enquirer article, the court still
recognized that aggressive tabloid behavior would not
automatically be protected by the newsworthiness exception.239
The court noted that “[t]he spacious interest in an unfettered press
is not without limitation” and that knowing or reckless lies
“masquerading as truth” were not exempt in the otherwise broad
“canopy of ‘news.’”240
These examples show California courts’ willingness to
question the reach of the newsworthiness exception for tabloids,
particularly when permitting the misuse of the plaintiff’s image or
name under First Amendment concerns is, in the court’s view,
somehow injurious or unfair.
b) New York
New York courts have also sought to reduce the scope of the
newsworthiness exception. For example, a New York court found
that the newsworthiness exception was not applicable even in the
case of an image of a likeness of a celebrity (never mind an actual
photograph of the celebrity, as in Solano).241 Muhammad Ali, the
famous boxer and self-proclaimed “the Greatest,” brought an
action against Playgirl magazine for a cover sketch that depicted a
nude black man in a boxing ring, with features very similar to his

237

Id. at 350 (quoting Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962)).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 352.
240
Id. (citations omitted). Although Eastwood’s recognition of knowing falsehood
exception has been recognized by some (though not all) other California decisions, part
of the case has been overruled by a 1984 amendment to the California right of publicity
statute: it is no longer true that the misuse of the plaintiff’s image be for “purposes of
advertising” or “solicitation of purchases.” See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr.
2d 713, 717 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing the amendment to section 3344).
241
See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

C04_GRANO_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

648

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/31/2010 1:08 PM

[Vol. 20:609

own, captioned “the Greatest.”242 The court acknowledged the
newsworthiness exception to the statute, but found that Playgirl’s
use of Ali’s likeness did not fall under the exception.243 Instead,
the court held that the likeness of Ali was “clearly included in the
magazine solely ‘for purposes of trade e. g. [sic], merely to attract
attention.’”244 The court did not hesitate to eliminate the
possibility of the newsworthiness exception, even contending that
the text accompanying the portrait was a “plainly fictional and
allegedly libellous [sic] bit of doggerel.”245 This decision could
have had wide-ranging implications for tabloids in particular, since
shocking covers are created expressly to attract attention.246
B. Protecting the Public’s Interest: Arguments for a Weaker Right
of Publicity
In contrast to those who advocate a wider, more protective
right of publicity, many scholars have taken their cues from courts
who have painted a broad picture of the newsworthiness exception.
These scholars present a right of publicity that favors the public
interest—or a world where the right of publicity ceases to exist
entirely.247
These scholars emphasize a broad expanse of
newsworthiness to protect First Amendment concerns or feel that
the expanding right of publicity impinges on the territory of other
established intellectual property rights.248
The problem with analyzing the case law of any given
jurisdiction is the expansive and often inexplicable gaps in the case
law. Although chronological gaps are the most noticeable, these
lurches in time are enhanced by the fact that celebrities often resort
to many different theories of recovery in scattershot filings that
allege violations of the right of publicity, defamation, false light

242

Id. at 725.
Id. at 727.
244
Id. (quoting Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
245
Id. at 727.
246
However, like most right of publicity cases, the case was not followed widely by
other courts, and its holding has not been acknowledged for many years.
247
See Goldman, supra note 126, at 216–25 (arguing that a right of publicity conflicts
with free market, First Amendment, and copyright interests).
248
See id.
243
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torts, and anything that will “stick.”249 This means that many right
of publicity claims are subsumed by tort recovery, never making it
to the trial stage, or, as previously mentioned, are settled out of
court.
1. Eliminating the Right of Publicity Entirely
Professor Lee Goldman advocates dispensing entirely with the
right of publicity.250 He notes a number of economic concerns,
such as that the right of publicity “encumbers free enterprise and
competition by granting the individual monopoly control over the
commercial value of his or her persona.”251 However, his main
contention is that the right of publicity is unnecessary.252 He posits
the idea that celebrities, unlike creators of other forms of
intellectual property, do not need a monetary incentive to “create”
their image.253 Expressing concern that the right is not simply
“unnecessary” but also “undesirable,” Goldman discourages a
societal view where fame has economic benefits on its own aside
from the celebrity’s primary activity, such as acting, athletics, or
otherwise.254
This view is fairly extreme, and Goldman himself
acknowledges that “there does not appear to be any ground swell
of support for such legislation [preempting the right of
publicity].”255 If the right of publicity were eliminated entirely,
celebrities pursuing claims against tabloids or online gossip
websites would be in the same situation they were prior to the
development of right of publicity; they would have to rely on
defamation, privacy, or other intellectual property claims to
249

See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) (claiming that
the magazine depicted Solano in a “false light”); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating the cause of action is for “false light invasion
of privacy”).
250
See generally Goldman, supra note 126.
251
Id. at 614.
252
Id.
253
See id. at 603 (“Actors love to act; sports stars enjoy the competition. Even for the
more mercenary, the rewards of the primary activity are often so great that additional
incentives are superfluous.”).
254
Id. at 604–05.
255
Id. at 628.
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recover for misuse of their image. However, Goldman’s idea that
the right of publicity differs from other rights is similarly framed
by other legal scholars’ concerns that the right of publicity is
infringing on the domain of other intellectual property rights.
2. The Need to Distinguish the Right from Other Intellectual
Property Rights
Other scholars concerned with the development of the right of
publicity express fears that its continued expansion will encroach
on existing intellectual property law, thus obscuring the purposes
of the individual—and separate—rights of publicity.256 Scholars
such as Tan strive to differentiate the right of publicity from the
development of trademark law.257 Tan notes that celebrities often
assert a right of publicity claim in addition to or instead of a
Lanham Act claim.258 This conflation of the two claims confuses
the “purpose” of the misuse—is it to mislead the consumer (e.g., a
tabloid reader) into thinking that the celebrity has sponsored the
use of the image, or is it to recoup economic benefits?259 When
courts confuse the two, the recovery allowed may vary, and
moreover, the purpose of the right of publicity is confused.260
Instead of recognizing that the right of publicity is property itself, a
trademark claim attempting to cover the right of publicity merely
considers the use of the image “an indicia of origin or source of a
product.”261 So, if Lindsay Lohan wanted to sue Star Magazine for
featuring her in an ad for their publication, the use of a Lanham
Act claim instead of a right of publicity claim would seem to
indicate only that the origin of the magazine ad is misleading,
rather than that the magazine had misappropriated her image,
which had value on its own. To counteract this problem, Tan
advocates a right of publicity that steps away from trademark-like
aspects and instead focuses on the economic impact.262

256
257
258
259
260
261
262

See infra notes 257–66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Tan, supra note 202, at 992.
Id. at 978.
See id. at 982.
See generally id. at 978–83.
Id. at 978.
See id. at 992.
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Other scholars note a similar interference of the right of
publicity in copyright claims and criticize the broadening scope of
the right.263 Some scholars claim that an expansive right of
publicity encroaches on copyright claims and results in
incongruous outcomes, when the right to publicity should be
preempted by copyright.264 For instance, “[a]n unfettered right of
publicity . . . can conflict with copyright principles, and abrogate
copyright protections,” which is particularly troublesome because
this outcome “is exactly what Congress sought to prevent by
enacting 301 [of the Copyright Act] preemption.”265 These legal
scholars propose a more limited right of publicity to counteract
these concerns.266
The similarities to other intellectual property rights can
sometimes lead to the conflation of the right of publicity with these
rights. This argument suggests that a limiting federal scheme
would eke out a place for the right of publicity without
overshadowing or nullifying existing intellectual property rights.
3. Protection of the First Amendment and the Press
First Amendment concerns are at the heart of many arguments
opposed to expanding either the right of publicity or its
newsworthiness exception. The balance between the privacy rights
of the individual and the newsgathering rights of the public often
tips in the favor of the public under the doctrine of free speech.267
Professor Goldman is particularly protective of the First
Amendment concerns that arise from limiting the press’s right to
report or comment on public figures, finding that they trump any
potential use for the right of publicity.268 He is not convinced by
263

See, e.g., Farbod Moridani, Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.: Persona and the Unfettered
Right of Publicity, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 317 (2006) (“[T]he scope of this right
has come into question because it primarily benefits celebrities and, in its broadest
application, conflicts with fundamental principles underlying copyright law.”).
264
See id. at 333; Fisher, supra note 184, at 115 (advocating “a middle of the road
option under which a more adequate balancing system, such as that under the Copyright
Act” guides the right of publicity).
265
Moridani, supra note 263, at 333.
266
Id.
267
Tan, supra note 202, at 924–25.
268
Goldman, supra note 126, at 614.
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the “free-riding” argument, instead declaring that “in the absence
of a convincing rationale for the right of publicity, even
commercial speech should receive First Amendment
protection.”269 The removal of the right of publicity would not
leave celebrities defenseless, but would prioritize the rights of the
public and validate newsworthiness exceptions.270
Others take a less extreme view, but still advocate the
importance of the First Amendment in connection with the right of
publicity. Many are troubled by attempts to limit the broad
protections of the newsworthiness amendment, suggesting instead
a form of categorization that better discerns between commercial
and non-commercial speech (the latter receiving full protection
under the First Amendment) rather than elimination of the
newsworthiness protection entirely.271 Professor Eugene Volokh
advances four potential categories to differentiate between types of
speech, in order to obtain the maximum protections of the
newsworthiness exception.272 Like other scholars, he fears that a
limitation of the newsworthiness exception, or a broad definition of
what defines “commercial” (i.e., unprotected) speech will limit the
freedom of speech generally, as defining commercial speech is a
difficult task.273
First Amendment concerns seem inextricably intertwined with
the newsworthiness exception, which reflects many of the core
concerns of scholars opposed to a broad federal right of
publicity.274 According to these scholars, to expand the right of
269

Id.
See id.
271
See id. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity,
40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003).
272
Volokh, supra note 271, at 904 (listing the four categories: non-commercial speech
favored by the right of publicity; commercial advertisements for those kinds of noncommercial speech; other kinds of commercial advertisements; and non-commercial
speech that is not protected by the right of publicity).
273
Id. at 928–29 (“Both commercial speech and noncommercial speech that uses
people’s appearance without their consent is equally harmful, both to the subjects’
economic interests and their dignity.
Different treatment of commercial and
noncommercial advertising thus seems . . . unjustified.”). Volokh notes, somewhat
hopefully, that the Supreme Court (in 2003) currently seemed to be leaning in the
direction of protecting commercial speech. Id.
274
See supra notes 267–73 and accompanying text.
270
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publicity would unfairly tread into the domain of free speech and
First Amendment protections.275
4. Broadly Defining the Newsworthiness Exception
Because case law concerning the right of publicity varies not
only between states (here, New York and California) but also
within the states themselves, there are many courts that endorse the
positions of scholars concerned with the direction of the right of
publicity, and particularly its impact on First Amendment
freedoms.276 Courts have seemingly ignored previous verdicts
restricting the newsworthiness exception in favor of protecting free
speech and a free press under the First Amendment.277 Some also
deflect concerns that an economic harm is being perpetrated
against the celebrity (or ignore it entirely) for the sake of creating a
broad newsworthiness exception and fuller protections for all
aspects of the First Amendment when it clashes with the right of
publicity.278
For example, in a pictorial in its March 1997 issue, Los
Angeles Magazine (“LAM”) digitally altered famous stills from
movies to show actors such as Cary Grant, Marilyn Monroe, and
plaintiff Dustin Hoffman wearing spring 1997 fashions.279 The
photograph chosen of Hoffman was an image from the movie
Tootsie, in a scene where Hoffman, in drag, is dressed in a red
evening gown in front of the American flag; LAM digitally
replaced the dress with a cream evening gown and matching heels,
noting that Hoffman “[wasn’t] a drag in a butter-colored silk gown
by Richard Tyler and Ralph Lauren heels.”280
Hoffman claimed that, by failing to secure his permission for
publication and alteration of the photo, the magazine had violated
his statutory and common law protections against misappropriation
of the right of publicity.281 The district court agreed, finding that
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

See supra notes 267–73 and accompanying text
See cases cited infra notes 279–94 and accompanying text.
See cases cited infra notes 279–94 and accompanying text.
See cases cited infra notes 279–94 and accompanying text.
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1182–83.
Id. at 1183.
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First Amendment protections did not attach to knowingly false
speech and that LAM had acted with actual malice.282 However,
the Ninth Circuit held otherwise.283 The Ninth Circuit held instead
that the article and its accompanying images were not purely
commercial speech, but instead a “combination of fashion
photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment.”284
Because LAM was accorded full First Amendment protections, its
protections could only be revoked with a showing of actual malice,
which the court refused to find—the article had made clear that the
images were altered.285 The court entered judgment for LAM.286
Another example comes from New York. Ann-Margret, an
actress and “woman of beauty, talent, and courage,” objected
strenuously when an adult magazine, High Society Celebrity Skin,
published a photographic still taken from one of her movies in
which she appeared topless.287 The magazine “specialize[d] in
printing photographs of well-known women caught in the most
revealing situations and positions that . . . [it is] able to obtain.”288
Although the plaintiff attempted to categorize the publication as
“hard core pornography,” the court settled on “tacky.”289
Relying on section 51 of the Civil Rights Laws, Ann-Margret
claimed that her right of publicity had been violated by this
unauthorized reproduction of the topless scene.290 The court
disagreed; it first held that her claim for a violation of the right to
privacy (ignoring, seemingly, the fact that her claim concerned the
right of publicity) was barred by the fact that she had already
willingly appeared in the film, which was seen by millions of
movie-goers.291 The court went on to state that, as “a woman who
has occupied the fantasies of many moviegoers over the years,”
282

Id. at 1184 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874–75
(C.D. Cal. 1999)).
283
Id.
284
Id. at 1185.
285
See id. at 1186–88.
286
Id. at 1189.
287
Ann-Margret v. High Soc’y Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 403–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
288
Id. at 403.
289
Id. at 403–04.
290
Id. at 404.
291
Id. at 405.
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Ann-Margret’s topless appearance in one of her films was a matter
of great public interest, and thereby protected by the
newsworthiness exception.292 The court focused more on the
actress’s “choice” to appear naked, rather than her loss of a
reasonable expectation of privacy.293
The court avoided explicitly stating whether or not a common
law right to publicity exists in New York, but denied recovery via
that route nonetheless, finding that the appearance of the picture in
the magazine did not constitute a use for trade or advertising
purposes.294
These examples of broad applications of the newsworthiness
protections are likely not welcomed by the celebrities who fill the
pages of tabloid magazines, but offer more protection to the public
in the form of preserving a free press.
C. The Role of Gossip in Society and the Media
For better or for worse, tabloids are inextricably linked with
another word that either categorizes or blasphemes—gossip.
Gossip’s role in the news and in the law has been the subject of
plenty of debate, although perhaps not given as serious attention as
other First Amendment concerns. Gossip even inspired Brandeis
and Warren in their initial discussion about the need for privacy:
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and
persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both
belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the
relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the
thoughts and aspirations of a people. When
personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and
crowds the space available for matters of real
interest to the community, what wonder that the
ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative
importance.295

292
293
294
295

Id.
See id.
See id. at 406–07.
Brandeis & Warren, supra note 30, at 196.
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Brandeis and Warren may have had personal motivations for
rallying the cry against protection of gossip and rumors,296 but
modern courts are unclear as to whether or not gossip is
newsworthy; i.e., are rumors protectable by the First
Amendment?297 Indulging in celebrity gossip is a guilty pleasure
that has been acknowledged by courts for a good part of the last
century, even preceding the named “right of publicity.”298 A New
York court noted that “the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors
and ‘public figures’ are subjects of considerable interest and
discussion by the rest of the population;”299 although the court did
not particularly condone this vice, it found that “when such are the
mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their
expression in the newspapers, books and magazines of the day.”300
Gossip’s potential to conflict with the knowing falsehood
exception eliminates it from protection in certain instances. The
court in Eastwood was troubled by the implications of the Enquirer
story; on one hand, the subject of the article was a matter of public
concern, but on the other, it was potentially a “calculated
falsehood” and simply a “coverup or subterfuge for commercial
appropriation of his name and likeness.”301 The court avoided
weighing the interests at stake by finding that, regardless of the
outcome, Eastwood had failed to plead that the article was
knowingly false.302 This begs the question of whether publications
are free to print unsubstantiated gossip (particularly when it so
closely resembles a “breaking news”-type story), placing the
burden of proving the falseness on the target of the publication.303
296
McCarthy and others allude to the rumors surrounding the circumstances of the
article—Brandeis’s sister’s lavish wedding at the center of Bostonian society and the
negative press coverage that it generated may have inspired the pair to write the article.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 1:12. Fittingly, this story is essentially just a rumor.
297
See infra notes 298–303 and accompanying text.
298
See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). The Sidis
case predates Haelan by more than a decade. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); supra text accompanying note 89.
299
Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
300
Id.
301
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
302
Id. at 352.
303
The court in Eastwood noted that this is the allocation of the burden in a claim for
defamation or invasion of privacy. See id.
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1. Baby Pictures
During the last several years, the parasitic relationship of
intrusive celebrity magazines feeding off of the publicity generated
by the Hollywood elite has evolved into a symbiotic one through
the sale of baby pictures. Before Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt
earned $14 million for the exclusive rights to photographs of their
newborn twins, they received $4 million from the sale of pictures
of their first daughter together, Shiloh, in 2005.304 In July of 2008,
actress Jessica Alba sold rights to the first photos of her daughter
Honor to OK! magazine for $1.5 million.305 Pop star Christina
Aguilera made the same amount when she sold the exclusive rights
to photographs of her son Max to People in 2007.306 Even Jennifer
Lopez, who has been out of the acting and musical spotlight for
several years, made an estimated $6 million when People
purchased the rights to the first images of her twins Max and
Emme in March of 2008.307 This trend may have been curbed by
the faltering global economy, but there are indications that neither
celebrities’ willingness to sell their private moments, nor the
public’s desire to consume such articles, have abated.308
Of course, with each photo spread comes not only the royalty
check, but a carefully vetted, favorable news story, showcasing the
celebrity and their newborn in the best possible light. For an
example of the flowing, cloying language, one can note how
Jennifer Lopez is overwhelmed with “twin bliss” as People reveals
the “intimate” secrets of the “happy new parents.”309 These sales
have hardly seemed to subside despite claims from some magazine

304

The $4 million the couple earned went to charity, as it did three years later when the
rights to pictures of their twins were sold. Jolie-Pitt Baby Pics, supra note 3.
305
Baby Alba Cashes in, TMZ, July 10, 2008, http://www.tmz.com/2008/07/10/babyalba-cashes-in/; see also World Exclusive: Jessica’s Dream Baby!, OK!, July 16, 2008,
http://www.okmagazine.com/2008/07/world-exclusive-jessica-albas-dream-baby-7881/
(advertising the “world exclusive” pictures of baby Honor, featured “only in OK!”).
306
Baram & Sheila, supra note 4.
307
Id.
308
Former Playboy girlfriend Kendra Wilkinson has documented the various stages of
her marriage and pregnancy with “exclusives” given to Us Weekly. See, e.g., Kendra’s
New Baby Drama!, US WKLY., Oct. 5, 2009, at 89.
309
See Jennifer Lopez: Twin Bliss!, PEOPLE, Mar. 20, 2008, at C1.
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editors that they are trying to halt the trend of purchasing these
images.
2. The Ugly Side of Free Press
However cheerful the stories of newlywed or newborn bliss
appear in the magazines, celebrities often find themselves vilified
by online bloggers. Although those who write online gossip
websites310 are often able to hide under the mantle of anonymity,
sometimes their cutting remarks are not shrugged off by the
celebrities, such as in the case of blogger Mario Lavandeira, better
known as Perez Hilton, and D.J. Samantha Ronson.311 After
Hilton’s blog posted an article claiming that Ronson planted
cocaine in then-girlfriend Lindsay Lohan’s car to generate
publicity and attempted to trade on Lohan’s celebrity status for
better publicity for herself, Ronson sued Hilton and the photo
agency for $20 million.312 Although her claim was for defamation,
it could easily have been for right of publicity; she could have
claimed (probably rightly so) that the scandalous story on Hilton’s
website brought in advertising revenue. Hilton, however, could
use the same excuse he used in the defamation lawsuit: that his
actions were protected under the First Amendment right that
protects the news and free speech.313 Much like in this defamation
lawsuit, Ronson’s claims could potentially be blocked if a court
were to find that Hilton was reporting news (which the public has a
right to know), rather than trading on her right of publicity.314

310

See supra note 173.
See Posting of Castina to PopCrunch, DJ Samantha Ronson Files $20 Millon [sic]
Libel Suit Against Perez Hilton and Celebrity Babylon, http://www.popcrunch.com/djsamantha-ronson-files-20-millon-libel-suit-against-perez-hilton-and-celebrity-babylon/
(July 15, 2007).
312
Id.
313
Posting of Castina to PopCrunch, Samantha Ronson Perez Hilton Defamation
Lawsuit Goes to Court, http://www.popcrunch.com/samantha-ronson-perez-hiltondefamation-lawsuit-goes-to-court/ (Oct. 11, 2007) (quoting Hilton’s lawyer stating that
his client “believes that the First Amendment protects him”).
314
Although the unreported case allegedly came out in Hilton’s favor, Ronson’s legal
troubles were far from behind her. Her own lawyers filed suit against her after she failed
to pay their fees; she countersued, claiming she was overcharged and misinformed. See
Posting of Nyzombie to The Insider, DJ Sam Ronson Suing Her Former Attorneys,
311
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Although no claims concerning a celebrity’s right to publicity
against an online publication have been reported yet, the growing
popularity of internet gossip will create more opportunities for
lawsuits to arise.
III. THE NEED FOR A LESS RESTRICTIVE FEDERAL RIGHT
The final Part of this Note advocates the adoption of a federal
statute incorporating various states’ approaches to the right of
publicity. It also emphasizes the history of federalization of
intellectual property rights as a basis for federalizing the right of
publicity. This Part then suggests a potential structure for the
federal statute, including an expansive newsworthiness exception
to protect First Amendment concerns and finds that an appropriate
federal statute should acknowledge the privacy aspects that have
underscored the right of publicity throughout its history—
expectations which are now being eroded by the sales of baby
pictures.
A. Uniformity by Federal Statute
A federal statute should be established for the right of publicity
to clarify inconsistencies between states, to bring a right of
publicity to states that do not yet recognize the right,315 and to
acknowledge the changing mores of society.
First, the common law of most states no longer adequately
recognizes the interests at stake in the face of new technology and
aggressive public interest in the lives of celebrities. In recognizing
the right of publicity for the first time, courts have found that “the
absence of precedent is a feeble argument” because “[t]he common
law system would have withered centuries ago had it lacked the
ability to expand and adapt to the social, economic, and political
changes inherent in a vibrant human society.”316 Eliminating the
right of publicity entirely would indeed protect First Amendment
http://www.theinsider.com/news/857258_DJ_Sam_Ronson_Suing_Her_Former_Attorne
ys (May 2, 2008).
315
See discussion supra Part I.A.
316
Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, Inc., 441 P.2d 141, 143 (Haw. 1968);
see also supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
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concerns,317 but it would entirely ignore the legal development of
the right of publicity, which protects important interests not
adequately recognized under privacy law.
Second, a federal right of publicity would allow for more
uniform results among and within states and would allow a
celebrity to assert his or her rights in any jurisdiction. The current
differences between states are particularly notable in the
newsworthiness exception. Both California and New York have
found that the underlying misrepresentation in a publication can
completely remove its newsworthiness protections.318 However,
neither state has consistently applied the newsworthiness exception
or explicitly stated what types of “news” are not protected, other
than those that are outright (and knowingly) false.319 A federal
statute would provide a clear framework to distinguish the
newsworthiness exception and acknowledge its roots in the First
Amendment as well as in defamation law.
B. Federalization of Other IP Rights
A federal right of publicity would acknowledge its core
difference from the right to privacy accepted by most states, by
recognizing publicity as a type of self-generated property, with
pecuniary value.320 Most other intellectual property rights are
federalized, as seen in the examples of copyright and patent, which
started out federalized, and trademarks, which required
federalization after enforcement became difficult between different
jurisdictions and detracted from its core goals.321 The right of
publicity has outgrown its common law roots, and courts resort to
other doctrines, such as privacy law, to cover its aspects.322 Other
intellectual property rights were federalized for the same reasons:
inconsistent results across the country and the necessity for a
creator or owner of intellectual property to protect his or her rights

317
318
319
320
321
322

See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.4.
See supra Part II.A.4.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Part I.A.1.a.
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on a nationwide scale.323 In this respect, the right of publicity
reflects the development of trademark law, more than the
straightforward history of copyrights or patents.324
Like
trademarks, which courts first addressed through the tort of unfair
competition,325 the right of publicity has outgrown the stop-gap
measures found in tort law and requires a uniform federal statute.
Careful drafting will also prevent the statute from encroaching on
the domain of other intellectual property rights and prevent courts
from overriding or ignoring these rights in favor of analyzing the
nebulous right of publicity.326
C. Proposition for a Federal Statute
1. Wording
Both statutes studied in this Note, those of New York and
California, form a good foundation for crafting the language of a
federal statute.327 A federal statute should contain language similar
to these statutes, but should omit or modify the language that has
tripped up many a court—for example, the ambiguous “portrait” in
the New York statute.328 The federal statute should include
specific terms, such as California’s inclusion of “name, voice,
signature, [and] photograph.”329 However, the broad category of
“image” or “likeness” or “photograph,”330 enclosed as a catch-all
in many state statutes, must be addressed somehow in the federal
statute. It is difficult to choose a word with such nuanced meaning
that it can be interpreted the same way universally but still include
the broad and bizarre reaches of the tabloids, such as a nude
sketch331 or a cartoon M&M.332 “Image” is the broadest but most

323

See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
Compare supra Part I.A.2.a., with Part I.B.
325
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
326
See supra notes 256–66 and accompanying text.
327
See supra Part I.B.3.
328
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
329
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010).
330
See generally id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAWS §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1101 (West 2001).
331
See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
324

C04_GRANO_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

662

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/31/2010 1:08 PM

[Vol. 20:609

helpful and could be contained from spiraling to encompass too
much by a descriptive appendix or legislative history to the
statute.333
A federal statute might read as follows: Any person or
organization who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or image, for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person’s prior consent, shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person injured as a result thereof or must
disgorge any profits unfairly obtained from the misuse.334
2. Inclusion of Newsworthiness Exception
The newsworthiness exception should be included and
acknowledged at the federal level through statutory codification, as
it is in California.335 This would recognize the nationwide reach of
most publications, especially the rising influence of the internet
and its ever-expanding list of gossip websites.336 Moreover, it
would protect First Amendment concerns and give freedom, but
not free reign, to the press. The newsworthiness exception at the
federal level should acknowledge several exceptions of its own.
First, it should incorporate New York’s reasonable relation
requirement.337 Pictures of celebrities arguably are the selling
point for most celebrity publications, and it would seem
incongruous to let these publications skirt a violation of the right of
publicity by using, for example, a cover picture of Brad Pitt and
332

See Burck v. Mars, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1330, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47861 (S.D.N.Y.
June 23, 2008).
333
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit would not agree with extending a right of
control over images that evoke a celebrity’s identity. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
334
This language is based on both the New York and California Statutes. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51. For the sake of clarity, certain phrases
have been excerpted from this example—the federal statute would, of course, need to
address minors’ ability to give consent, how damages would be calculated, whether the
right of publicity applies to products (such as commemorative plates), etc., as has been
done at the state level. It also would likely include more broad language (e.g., “person or
persons,” etc.).
335
See supra Part I.B.3.a.
336
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
337
See supra Part I.B.3.b.
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Angelina Jolie to publicize an article inside the magazine that was
about trout-fishing. Second, it is not necessary to acknowledge a
knowing falsehood or actual malice standard.338 This suggestion
comes not from a feeling of schadenfreude at the misfortune that
befalls a celebrity who sees herself vilified on a tabloid cover
story,339 but because defamation and libel laws are already wellestablished and are better suited for addressing these claims.340
Recourse for hurt feelings and damaged reputations should be
recovered via these pathways, not through claims brought under
the right of publicity, which should focus instead on the property
right aspects.341
D. Gossip as a Protectable Interest
The reasoning of Brandeis and Warren is outdated in the
context of publicity rights.342 Protection of gossip, no matter how
tenuous the “news” it reports, should still be protected by the First
Amendment because “[t]he compass of the First Amendment
covers a vast spectrum of tastes, views, ideas and expressions.”343
It is of little doubt to most courts that the ins and outs of
celebrities’ daily lives, no matter how mundane pictures of stars
acting “just like us” may seem, are of public interest. As Judge
Valente of the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
reluctantly admitted, “We cannot undertake to pass judgment on
those reading tastes.”344 Courts—and, by turn, the legislature—
should not restrict the rights of the press simply because the news
reported is sensational and concerns an individual.345 Hence, the
338
See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Even though the
[newsworthiness] exceptions are to be broadly construed, the newsworthiness privileges
do not apply where a defendant uses a plaintiff’s name and likeness in a knowingly false
manner to increase sales of the publication.”).
339
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
340
Nonetheless, due to the almost universal inclusion of this exception at the state level,
it would be somewhat difficult to eliminate it from the federal level, particularly if the
point of the statute is to clarify the limits of the right of publicity, not to obfuscate them.
341
See supra Part I.A.2.
342
See supra notes 295–98 and accompanying text.
343
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Pring v.
Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982)).
344
Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
345
See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
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newsworthiness exception to the right of publicity allows courts to
balance the privacy interests of such an individual with the public
interest to be informed, whether by The New York Times or by Us
Weekly.346 While placing the burden on the target of the
publication to prove falsity could encourage the proliferation of
untrue articles in certain publications that are unconcerned with
their reputation (i.e., tabloids), it is no different than the
expectations of privacy or defamation law.347
E. What Is Newsworthy Now?
For all its growth, the right of publicity cannot and should not
ignore its roots in privacy law.348 The newsworthiness exception
incorporates these privacy concerns while recognizing First
Amendment limitations—celebrities have the ability to make
something newsworthy or not by their actions. It is unreasonable
to expect perfect privacy when one willingly invites a magazine
into one’s home (e.g., to take the baby pictures exclusively
promised to the magazine).349 Is it reasonable for a celebrity to
collect millions of dollars for the exclusive rights to pictures of her
baby along with an approved, positive story about the family, and
then sue a publication for a negative story that casts her in an
unfavorable light, expecting privacy during her sweaty gym
workout or rekindled romance with a married coworker? This
author argues that this would be an unreasonable result, both
because it goes against the notions of privacy grounded in
Prosser’s four torts,350 and also because it encroaches too greatly
on the First Amendment. It is unfair to attempt to manipulate the
media into posting only favorable stories (no celebrity has
seemingly ever sued on a story that cast a glowing light on their
actions). By recognizing a newsworthiness exception in a federal
statute, courts would have the liberty to analyze the privacy
implications of celebrities’ actions and consider just how private a
346
See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002), for a discussion of
the newsworthiness exception.
347
See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
348
See supra Part I.A.1.
349
See supra Part II.C.1.
350
See supra text accompanying note 53.

C04_GRANO_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

CELEBRITY BABY PICTURES

3/31/2010 1:08 PM

665

celebrity’s life can be when that life is featured on glossy cover
pages brokered by the celebrity herself. At the same time, these
courts would be able to acknowledge the property underpinnings
of the right by recognizing situations in which the economic
interests of the celebrity are violated by “free-riding” publications.
In a sense, an expanded federal right of publicity with this
emphasis would force celebrities to choose where to reap the
benefits of their celebrity: either through selling stories and
pictorials to magazines, thereby reducing their privacy
expectations, or by preserving their privacy and collecting
damages through suits against magazines that exploited their right
of publicity.
Even under this type of statutory scheme, however, federal
courts might be without guidance in certain circumstances.
Consider the celebrity family who recently profited from sales of
photographs of their newborn to a popular glossy tabloid. The
same magazine later publishes unflattering pictures of the celebrity
family without their permission. If these pictures were used in an
advertisement card for the magazine, this would certainly
constitute a violation of the proposed federal statute of the right of
publicity; this is because the pictures themselves, in conjunction
with the advertising card, are not “news.” But what if these
pictures were instead used as a part of a cover story for the
magazine’s next issue? The court would have the opportunity to
consider the “newsworthiness” of the story—not whether the story
had merit or was more than mere gossip, because gossip can
constitute news, but whether the story was more than an attempt to
trade on the “value” of the family. Suffice it to say, there is no
statutory scheme that can completely assuage the tense relationship
between tabloids and the celebrities they cover; under any
language, courts would still occasionally be plagued by cases such
as the ones examined in this Note.
Clearly, even a federal statute would often require case-by-case
analyses to distinguish legitimate uses from non-legitimate ones.
However, a uniform statute would encourage similar results in
each jurisdiction, following the same statutory language and the
same body of case law.
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CONCLUSION
The right of publicity can represent the delicate balance
between a humdrum public in line at the supermarket, gawking at
the latest tabloid headlines, and the seemingly fascinating
celebrities who stroll Robertson Boulevard, a long line of
paparazzi in tow. The right of publicity must acknowledge its
roots in privacy and the rights of the celebrities by whom we are so
fascinated, but at the same time, recognize the property aspects that
make the right of publicity so valuable and worth protecting in the
first place. The right of publicity has strange bedfellows for an
area of the law, from The National Enquirer to Playgirl to Hustler,
but its lurid appearances should not detract from its worth. Gossip
too has a place under the sheltering umbrella of the First
Amendment. A federalized right of publicity is necessary to
acknowledge changing times, changing attitudes, and changing
expectations of privacy.

